However, the contract governing the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is set to expire today (December 31) â and Ukraine doesnât intend to renew it. This means that, as of tomorrow, Europe will no longer be receiving gas through Ukraine. The consequences could be dear. The countries most affected will obviously be the direct recipients of the Ukrainian transit route gas, especially Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Italy.
The stopping of Ukrainian transit will not pose an immediate supply security risk to these countries: though the capacity of alternative pipeline routes âTurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary â to replace the Ukrainian transit is limited, storage levels in the EU remain high, and alternative supply sources exist, mainly in the form of shipped LNG.
Prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU imported most of its gas via pipelines â mostly from Russia. Since then, in its attempt to decouple from Russian gas, the bloc has massively boosted its LNG imports, which have risen from 20 percent to 50 percent of total gas imports. Almost half of the EUâs LNG imports in 2024 came from the US, though absurdly the EU last year also boosted its imports of Russian LNG â all while reducing its imports of cheaper pipeline gas from the country.
The significantly higher price of LNG â especially that imported from the US â compared to Russian pipeline gas has severely impacted both European households and businesses. Indeed, the recent Draghi report highlighted high energy costs as one of the main reasons for the EUâs loss of competitiveness. The report emphasises that European companies face significantly higher energy costs compared to their US counterparts: energy prices remain â2-3 times higherâ for electricity and â4-5 times higherâ for natural gas. These high costs have pushed large parts of Western Europe â first and foremost Germany â into recession and even outright deindustrialisation, and continue to seriously hinder industrial growth and investment.
Europe's center is not holding The collapse of the government in France and the ruling coalition in Germany spells continued crises â and don't think war has nothing to do with it.
âBarbarism is on the ballot,â columnist George Will declared this week, noting that if the next president doesnât transform the current policy on Ukraine, which is âso timid, tentative and subject to minute presidential calibrations,â then Russiaâs Vladimir Putinâs war could end up being a âgreat rehearsalâ for World War Three.
Meanwhile, the New York Times has said that âtwo different futures loomâ for Ukraine depending on the outcome of Tuesdayâs election, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.
Much of this is based on the candidatesâ rhetoric, and, in the case of Harris, the Biden Administrationâs current policy of supporting Ukraine with weapons and aid for âas long as it takesâ to defeat Russia. Harris has suggested she would continue this policy, to âstand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies,â if elected. She has also accused Donald Trump of being too cozy with Putin and said she would not talk to the Russian president.
For his part, Trump has said he would bring all sides to the table and end the war in a day, and he has been critical of continued U.S aid to Ukraine, which has totaled some $175 billion ($106 billion of which has gone directly to the Ukraine government) since 2022. He has offered no details for how he would end the war or bring the parties together.
But does it matter? In some ways, yes, foreign policy experts tell RS. One side wants to assure that U.S. strategy wonât change, the other advocates for a bold if not abrupt shift that involves a step back from the narrative George Will evinces, that Putin is a barbarian that can only be stopped with more war.
Those same experts say Ukraine is losing, and more weapons and more fighting cannot help. They also point out that official Washington is beginning to realize this too, as is Europe, and a shift toward diplomacy will likely happen no matter who is in the White House come January 2025. (...)
The British occupation of New York lasted from 1776 to 1783. Back then it was the so-called Tories, pro-British Americans, who said that it would be âimpossible to defeat the British armiesâ, that America does not exist. In fact, despite a string of American victories, such as the Battle of Ticonderoga, British domination of North America was a fact, especially along the coast lines.
Yet, on November 25, 1783, the so-called âimpossibleâ happened and British troops evacuated New York. The British army was defeated and the USA finally independent, thanks to the brave American people but also thanks to the French support and intervention.
History is full of examples where a presumably weaker opponent defeated a stronger army. What was key in all those struggles was the sheer will of those people yearning for freedom. In this kind of struggle, defeatist voices are never good advisors. Seeing a certain group of Americans now demanding this from Ukrainians can only be described a deeply un-American. Would they sell their homeland to a foreign enemy? It sure looks this way.
If they lived 240 years ago and had their way or France refused to help, America would still have a king. Thankfully, the voice of reason prevailed. It should be a lesson and blueprint for all of us today, on both sides of the pond.
Lots of developments in Ukraine in the last few days. It looks like Ukraine has found a way out of what many thought was a stalemate - which may not have been a stalemate at all! Very interesting. Still developing.
Almost 100 days have now passed since the Congress passed $61 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine, a measure that included a condition that required the Biden Administration to present to the legislative body a detailed strategy for continued U.S. support.
When the funding bill was passed with much fanfare on April 23, Section 504, page 32 included the following mandate:
âNot later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to 18 the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on 20 Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a strategy regarding United States support for Ukraine against aggression by the Russian Federation: Provided, That such strategy shall be multi-year, establish specific and achievable objectives, define and prioritize United States national security interestsâ¦â
It is now August and There is still no sign on the part of the Biden Administration of any intention to submit such a strategy to Congress. This inevitably leads to the suspicion that no such strategy in fact exists. It also suggests that without a massive change of mindset within the administration, it is not even possible to hold â let alone make public âserious and honest internal discussions on the subject, as these would reveal the flawed and empty assumptions on which much of present policy is based. (...)
